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Abstract
This paper examines how a preference for robustness a¤ects optimal consumption-portfolio
rules as well as the equilibrium asset returns when investors care about their social status (or
they have the spirit of capitalism). It is shown that the interaction of these two preferences
leads to higher equity premium by enhancing investorss e¤etive risk aversion and making
them more conservative in risk-taking. In addition, we nd that they also lead to greater
precautionary savings and lower risk-free rate in general equilibrium. We then show that the
interaction of the two preferences has the potential to resolve the equity premium puzzle and
the risk-free rate puzzle for plausible parameter values.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper, Mehra and Precott (1985) showed that in order to replicate the empirical
risk premium in the representative agent paradigm, the investor must display astronomically high
levels of risk aversion. This theoretical di¢ culty was documented as the equity premium puzzle.
Since the high risk premium implies either a high average equity return or a low average risk-free
rate, Weil (1989) documented another risk-free rate puzzle: with the desire for consumption-
smoothing and a low risk-free rate, individuals still save enough that per capita consumption
grows rapidly. In order to solve these asset pricing puzzles, two solutions have been put forward
by Baskin and Chen (1996), Smith (2001) and Maenhout (2004), respectively. On one hand,
Baskin and Chen (1996) and Smith (2001) suggest that with higher e¤ective risk avesion driven
by the spirit of capitalism (henceforth SOC), the individual will be more conservative in risk-
taking and more frugal in consumption spending and hence stock prices tend to be more volatile
than when the SOC is absent. On the other hand, Maenhout (2004) shows that robustness leads
to environment-specic e¤ective risk aversion and hence dramatically decreases the demand for
equities and raises precautionary savings simultaneously.1 Therefore, robustness helps to resolve
both the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles in the equilibrium setting. Since the
implications for asset pricing of these two modelling strategies are examined separately, high
preference parameter values for the SOC or robustness might be needed implausibly.
By combining these two modelling strategies into the standard Merton-type model, the paper
shows how the SOC and robustness interact in determining asset prices and how the asset pricing
puzzle can be resolved. On one hand, both the preference for SOC and for robustness increase
the e¤ective risk aversion, make investors more pessimistic in risk-taking and hence generate the
high risk premium. On the other hand, these two channels lead to more precautionary savings in
general equilibrium and reduce the equilibrium risk-free rate. The qualitative and quantitative
analysis show that the combination of these two channels can resolve the risk premium puzzle
and the risk-free rate puzzle.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the Merton-type model with the
SOC. Section 3 derives robust consumption and portfolio rules by incorporating model uncertainty
into the basic model. Section 4 examines asset pricing rules in a robust equilibrium and presents
the calibration exercise. Section 5 concludes.
1Luo (2015) studies how robustness a¤ects the intertemporal hedging demand for the risky asset in a constant-
absolute-risk-averse (CARA) model with uninsurable labor income.
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2 The Merton-type Model with the SOC
In this paper, we follow Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Smith (2001) and consider a continuous-
time version of the Merton-type model (1969, 1972) with the SOC, where the typical consumer
maximizes expected lifetime utility from consumption of two good: consumption ct and
statuswt, and has assess to two nancial assets: one riskless, paying an instantaneous return
r and one risky (equities), paying a constant intantaneous expected excess return of    r. The
objective function to maximize (in the absence of a preference for robustness) is
E0
Z T
t=0
exp ( t)u (ct; wt) dt

;
where u (ct; wt) =
 
catw
b
t
1 
= (1  ),  (> 0) denotes the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion2, 
is the discount rate, a and b are positive parameters satisfying a + b  13, and b measures the
degree of the SOC.
The price of the risky asset evolves according to the standard geometric Brownian motion
with constant drift coe¢ cients driven by a standard Wiener process Bt:
dSt = Stdt+ StdBt: (1)
Therefore the state equation for wealth is
dwt = [wt (r + t (  r))  ct] + twtdBt; (2)
where t is the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset at time t. Both controls (ct, t)
are nonanticipating and suitably adapted to the -algebra generated by the underlying Brownian
motion.
In this benchmark model with the SOC, we assume that the consumer trust the model totally,
i.e., no model uncertainty. The value function is denoted by V (wt; t). The Hamilton-Jacobi-
2The calculations in the paper hold well for the case of  2 (0;+1). However, in the following discussion, we
assume that coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  is larger than one for two reasons. One is that we can guarantee
that optimal consumption is nonnegative with the assumption of  > 1. The other one is empirically relevant. In
most of the simulation or estimation excercises, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is larger than (or equals)
one. Baskin and Chen (1996) also impose this assumption in their research.
3Notice that
 
catw
b
t
1 
= (1  ) =

c
a=(a+b)
t w
a=(a+b)
t
(a+b)(1 )
= (1  ). Since the utility function is ordinally
meaningful, the relative values of a and b are important. Then, we impose the assumption of a + b  1 for
simplication.
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Bellman (henceforth HJB) equation for this optimizing problem can be written as
0 = sup
t;ct
" 
catw
b
t
1 
1     V (w; t) +D
(;c)V (wt; t)
#
; (3)
where
D(;C)V (wt; t) = Vw [w (r + t (  r))  ct] + Vt + 1
2
Vww
2
t
2w2t ; (4)
with boundary condition
V (wT ; T ) = 0: (5)
Solving the above HJB subject to (2) and (5) leads to the following portfolio-consumption rules:
ct =

1  e (T t)
a
a+ b
wt; (6)
and
t =
1
[1 + (a+ b) (   1)]
  r
2
; (7)
where
  1
a (   1) + 1
"
 + r (a+ b) (   1) + 1
2
(a+ b) (   1)
[1 + (a+ b) (   1)]

  r

2#
: (8)
Equation (6) tells that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) of the consumer is an in-
creasing function of the degree of the SOC, b. With stronger degree of the SOC (larger b), the
consumer attaches more importance on the "status" good rather than the consumption good
and hence the MPC is smaller. It is shown in equation (7) that the optimal share of wealth
invested on risky assets is also constant, however, the e¤ective coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
([1 + (a+ b) (   1)]) depends on the degree of the SOC, b, and the coe¢ cient of the relative
risk aversion, . Due to the assumption of  > 1, then an increase in the degree of the SOC
increases the e¤ective risk aversion, d db =    1 > 0, and hence reduces demand for the risky
asset, dtdb =
(1 )t
R < 0. These results are very similar to Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Smith
(2001).
3 Robust Portfolio and Consumption Rules
3.1 Incorporating Model Uncertainty
In the above Merton model with the SOC, the consumer knows the exact probability model
when they make decisions under rational expectations. In reality, the decision maker accepts the
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reference modelas useful, but suspects it to be misspecied. She therefore wants to consider
alternative models that are reasonably similar to the reference model when computing her contin-
uation payo¤. In a pure di¤usion setting, Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2002; henceforth AHS)
show that this adverse alternative model simply adds an endogenous drift u (Wt) to the law of
motion of the state variable wt,
dwt =  (wt) dt+  (wt) [ (wt)u (wt) dt+ dBt] ; (9)
where  (wt) and  (wt) are short-hand notation for the drift and di¤ustion terms in (2). The
drift adjustment u (wt) is chosen endogenously to minimize the sum of the expected (di¤erential)
continuation payo¤ of (4), but adjusted to reect the additional drift component in (9), and of
an entropy penalty, namely,
inf
u

DV + u (wt) (wt)2 + 1
2bu (wt)2  (wt)2

: (10)
The rst two terms in the objective are the expected continuation payo¤ when the state variable
follows (9), that is, the alternative model based on drift distortion u. The third term stands for the
entropy penalty incurred when selecting adverse drift distortions in (10) and moving away from
the reference model. The parameter b > 0 measures the strength of the preference for robustness
(b = 0 corresponds to expected utility maximization). Therefore the more robust decision maker
(b larger) has less faith in the reference model and will consider drift distortions when evaluating
her continuation payo¤. The parameter b is xed exogenously and state independent in the AHS
minimum-entropy robustness model. In this paper, following Maenhout (2004), we impose the
"homothetic robustness" property on the model setup, which endogenize b by scaling  by the
value function and preference parameters, denoted by 	 (w; t) > 0, namely,
	 (wt; t) =

(a+ b) (1  )V (wt; t) > 0: (11)
Applying these assumptions to the Merton-type model with the SOC gives us,
0 = sup
;c
inf
u
" 
catw
b
t
1 
1     V (w; t) +D
(;c)V (w; t) + u (wt) (wt)
2 +
1
2	 (w; t)
u (wt)
2  (wt)
2
#
;
(12)
where D(;c)V (w; t) is given by (4), subject to (5).
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3.2 Robust Consumption and Portfolio Rules
The HJB equation (12) will be solved in this section. Solving rst for the inmization part of the
problem yields
u =  	Vw: (13)
Substituting for u in the HJB equation gives
0 = sup
;c
" 
catw
b
t
1 
1     V (wt; t) +D
(;C)V (wt; t)  	
2
V 2w
22w2t
#
; (14)
subject to (5). Plugging equations (4) and (11) into equation (14) leads to
0 = sup
;c
" 
catw
b
t
1 
1     V + Vw [wt (r + t (  r))  ct] + Vt +
1
2

Vww   V
2
w
(a+ b) (1  )V

22w2t
#
:
(15)
The following results can then be obtained.
Proposition 1 Equation (15) subject to (5) is solved by
V (wt; t) =
 
1  e (T t)

!(a( 1)+1)
a
a+ b
a(1 ) w(a+b)(1 )t
(1  ) : (16)
where   1a( 1)+1
h
 + r (a+ b) (   1) + 12 (a+b)( 1) 
  r

2i
. The optimal portfolio and con-
sumption rules, valid for  > 0, are given by
ct =

1  e (T t)
a
a+ b
wt; (17)
t =
1
 
  r
2
; (18)
where     + [1 + (a+ b) (   1)].
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
This result is remarkably simple, in light of the complexity of the HJB equation (15). The
optimal fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset is independent of wealth and time due to
the homotheticity. The optimal portfolio weight is also the standard Merton solution, where the
e¤ective risk aversion is determined by the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , the preference
parameter for robustness, , and the preference parameter for the status, b. Robustness amounts
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therefore to an increase in the e¤ective risk aversion. Equation (18) degenerates to the case
without the preference for model uncertainty or the one of Meanhout (2004) without the SOC.
The consumption rule has the same structure as Mertons solution. The di¤erence is that the key
parameter determining the consumption wealth ratio, , depends on the preferences for robustness
and the SOC.
Given that the nonrobust consumer has power utility, she is equally willing to substitute
over time as across states (as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is , which is also the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution). What robustness does is to make the con-
sumer less willing to substitute across states (as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion becomes
 + [1 + (a+ b) (   1)] > [1 + (a+ b) (   1)]), without altering the willingness to subsitute in-
tertemporally (as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution remains 1=). In order to make this
point more clear, we will extend the model to stochastic di¤erential utility (SDU).
3.3 Stochastic Di¤erential Utility
To further explore the implications on the optimal rules and asset pricing of both robustness and
the SOC, we extend the model to the case with stochastic di¤erential utility. Taking (15) and
replacing U (c; w)  V by the normalized aggregator of Du¢ e-Epstein, we obtain
0 = sup
;c
264 11 

(catwbt)
1 
((1 )V )
 
1 
   (1  )V

+ Vw [wt (r + t (  r))  ct]
+Vt +
1
2

Vww   V
2
w
(a+b)(1 )V

2t
2w2t
375 ; (19)
where  1 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  is risk aversion, and  is the
robustness parameter.
Proposition 2 Equation (19) subject to equation (5) is solved by
V (wt; t) =

 


1  e (T t)
  (1 )(a(1 ) 1)(1 ) w(a+b)(1 )t
(a+ b) (1  ) ; (20)
where   (1 )( 1)(a(1 ) 1)
h
 1 1  + r (a+ b) (   1) + 12 (a+b)( 1) 
  r

2i
,   (a+ b)   1 a(1 )a(1 ) 1
1
a+b
  
1 
1
a(1 ) 1
, and    + [1 + (a+ b) (   1)]. The optimal portfolio and consumption rules
are given by
ct =

1  e (T t)
a
a+ b
wt; (21)
t =
1
 
  r
2
: (22)
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Proof. See Appendix 2.
Since an investor with a homothetic preference for robustness 	 = = ((a+ b) (1  )V ) and
CRRA utility is observationally equivalent to a Du¢ e-Epstein-Zin investor with the EIS 1= and
the e¤ective relative risk aversion  ,4 the only change in Propostion 3 relative to Propostion
2 concerns the parameters in the consumption rule and value function, which reects the fact
that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution has now been disentangled from the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion.
To explore the quantitative e¤ect of robustness and the SOC on the optimal portfolio, we
present the following useful calculations. The robust investor can be viewed as using an alternative
model that adds an endogenous drift term to equation (2)
dwt = [wt (r + 

t (  r))  ct] + twt [twtudt+ dBt] :
Because all uncertainty in this budget constrait (i.e., the Brownian motion Bt) stems from the
return on the risky asset, this implies that under the modied Markov process, the investor worries
that the stock price evolves according to
dSt
St
=

+ twt
2u

dt+ dBt
=

  (  r) 
 

dt+ dBt;
where the second equality obtains upon substitution of (13), (22), and (20). Consequently, the
investor worries that the excess return on the risky asset is not the true equity premium
(  r) ( EPT ), but rather EPP , dened as
EPP  Eut

dSt
St
  rdt

=
1 + (a+ b) (   1)
 
(  r) dt; (23)
where Eu

t [] denotes the expectation according to the alternative model that includes the optimal
drift distortionu. Hence,  can be then found to be
 = [1 + (a+ b) (   1)] EPT   EPP
EPP
: (24)
4The proof is similar to Proposition 2 in Maenhout (2004).
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4 Equilibrium Asset Pricing
To explore the equilibrium implication of the robust decision rules with status concern in the
previous section, we now consider a simple exchange economy in the style of Lucas (1978). The
representative agent recieves an endowment, which he has to consume in equilibrium, and can
trade two assets in the economy: a risky asset entitling the agent to the risky endowment (the
dividend) and a riskless asset. The returns of these two assets adjust to support a no-trade
equilibrium. By utlilizing the above explicit partial-equilibrium result for SDU in the presence of
the SOC and robustness, I show in closed form how the di¤erent determinants of behavior (EIS
 1, risk aversion , SOC b and uncertainty aversion ) a¤ect the equilibrium equity premium
and risk-free rate.
4.1 Robust Equilibrium, Market Price of Risk and Asset Pricing
For simplicity we assume that the dividend or endowment process follows a geometric Brownian
motion process,
dDt = DDtdt+ DDtdBt; (25)
where the expected growth rate D and the standard deviation D are strictyly positive parame-
ters. It is conjectured that the price St of the risky asset representing a claim on the divident
stream follows an Itô process:
dSt = St

S   Dt
St

dt+ SStdBt;
where the coe¢ cients S and S are to be determined from equilibrium conditions. The conjecture
implies that the total return on the risky asset, consisting of both the dividend yield and the capital
gain, is simply
dSt +Dtdt
St
= Sdt+ SdBt: (26)
Denoting as before the risk-free rate by r, and the fraction of wealth allocated to the risky asset
by , the representative consumers wealth dynamics are
dwt = [wt (r + t (S   r))  ct] + tSwtdBt: (27)
By utilizing the results from Section 2 in the innite horizion case, we rewritten the HJB for
a robust investor with intertemporal substitution elasticity  1, risk aversion , preference for
8
robustness  and demand for status b as follows:
0 = sup
;c
264 11 

(catwbt)
1 
((1 )V )
 
1 
   (1  )V

+ Vw [wt (r + t (S   r))  ct]
+Vt +
1
2

Vww   V
2
w
(a+b)(1 )V

22Sw
2
t
375 : (28)
Denition A robust equilibrium consists of a consumption rule c, a portfolio rule , and
prices S and r, such that, (1), the agent solves (28) subject to the transversality condition,
limt!+1 E

e tV (wt)

= 0; (2), markets clear continuously, namely, c = D (good market
clears) and  = 1 (asset markets clear).
Given the closed-form solutions for the partial equilibrium model in Section 3, the optimum
of (28) is obtained and summerized explicitly in the following propostion.
Proposition 3 Equation (28) subject to the transversality condition is solved by
V (w; t) =

a
a+ b
 1 
1 

(1 )(a(1 ) 1)
(1 ) w
(a+b)(1 )
(1  ) ; (29)
where     a(1 )(a(1 ) 1)


(1 )(a+b)   r   12 1 

S r
S
2
. The optimal porfolio and consumption
rules are given by
ct = wt; (30)
t =
1
 
S   r
2S
; (31)
Combining the optimal solutions provided in the above propostion and the conditions of
market clearing, we can derive the equilibrium risk-free rate, the equity premium and the worst-
case scenario for the equity premium supporting the equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In the robust equilibrium with the SOC, the price of the risky asset is given by
St =
Dt
 . The excess return on the risky asset follows
dSt +Dtdt
St
  rdt =  CSdt+ DdBt; (32)
with CS  cov
 
dC
C ;
dS
S

. The equilibrium risk-free rate is given by
r =
a
a+ b
 + [1  a (1  )]D   2  a (1  )
2
 2D: (33)
The pessimistic scenario for the expected equity premium supporting the equilibrium is
EP P = [1 + (a+ b) (   1)]CS : (34)
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Proof. See appendix 6.2.
Combining equation (31) with the clearing condition of asset market, we obtain the equilibrium
equity premium: S  r =  2S , which tells that compared with Mehra and Prescott (1985), there
are two new channels to increase the equilibrium equity premium: one comes from the preference
for robustness due to uncertainty aversion (), the other stems from the preference for social status.
It is obvious that the uncertainty aversion parameter  is a positive scalar in  . Dene the e¤ective
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion: 0  1 + (a+ b) (   1). Even though we are not certain of the
relation 0 >  for the simplifying assumption of a+b  1, we still know that the stronger demand
for social status the larger of the e¤ective risk aversion, i.e., d0=db = (   1) > 0.5 This CCAPM
result (Breeden, 1979) follows directly from the fact that consumption growth and equity return
are by construction perfectly correlated in the model.
The market price of riskdenoted by  , is determined by market risk, , model uncertainty,
, and the preference for the SOC, b. Except for the empirical prediction of the model is that the
market price of risk is higher than what would be expected based on genuine risk aversion alone,
the model shows that the higher degree of the desire for status (larger b) will induce the higher
price of risk, since the consumer with higher e¤ective risk aversion will reduces the demand for
risky asset.
The robust equilibrium model with the SOC can also explain Weils (1989) risk-free rate puzzle
better. Equation (33) shows that the equilibrium risk-free rate depends on the four determinants
of the economy: time preference, intertemporal substitution and growth, model uncertainty and
the e¤ective risk aversion adjusted by the SOC. Robustness drives down the equilibrium risk-
free rate through the precautionary savings channel. However, the spirit of capitalism reduces
the equilibrium risk-free rate through two channels. On one hand, the SOC decreases the e¤ec-
tive time preference rate, i.e., 0

 aa+b

<  and hence raises the degree of patience, which
will enforce consumers to save more and consume less. On the other hand, the consumer with
higher desire for status displays the higher degree of the e¤ective risk aversion and hence enjoys
more precautionary savings, that is, the precautionary saving term (2  a (1  ))  2D=2 will be
larger. The e¤ective elasticity of intertemporal substitution, dened by 0  1= [a (   1) + 1], is
decoupled from the e¤ective risk aversion 0. This result is a natural extention of the recursive
preference by incorporating the demand for status. It is shown in equation (34) that di¤erent
5 If assuming a + b > 1, then we have that 0 > . Moreover, if a + b = 1 holds, the model degenerates to the
case of Maenhout (2004).
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from the partial equilibrium result (i.e., EPP = [1 + (a+ b) (   1)] (  r) = ), the equilibrium
worst-case (true equity premium) EP P (= EP

T ) does not depend on the robustness parameter .
Hence,  can be taken as an index measuring the distance between the true and pessimistic equity
premium.
There are two facts to be noted. Firstly, the true equilibrium equity premiun is larger than
the pessimistic equity premium due to t 2 [0; 1]. Secondly, a higher degree of the desire for
status leads to a large divergence between these two premiums, namely, @ (EP T   EPP ) =@b =
@
 
(1  t)  2S

=@b > 0. Therefore, the robust equilibrium with the SOC can be interpreted as
follows: robust investors with the demand for status worry heavily that the observed premium
is too high to be true and invest cautiously and pessimistically. And this conservative behavior
generates a high equity premium. Simultaneously, the SOC and robustness makes investors more
potient and more conservative, the resulted precautionary savings keep the equilibrium risk-free
rate low.
4.2 Calibration and Empirical Implications
In this section, given the estimated parameter values for D (= c) ; cS = cS, D (= c), and ,
the preference parameters , , , a, b, and  are chosen to match the observed equity premium and
risk-free rate according to equations (32) and (33). Firs of all, we take the estimated consumption
and return parameters from Campbell (1999) based on a long annual sample from 1891 to 1994:
c = 0:01742, c = 0:03257, S = 0:18534,  = 0:497, r = 1:955%, and S   r = 6:258%. For our
purpose, we take some preference parameters from Maenhout (2004) as follows:  = 0:02,  = 7,
and  1 = 0:6. The calibrated preference parameter for robustness  equals 14 in Maenhout
(2004), which seems too large. In our model, the combinations between the SOC and robustness
can plausably decrease the degree of robustness demanded to generate the high equity premium
and the low risk-free rate. To see this, we rewritten equaiton (33) as follow:
 =
a
a+b   r + [1  a (1  )]D
1
2 [2  a (1  )]2D
  [(a+ b) (   r) + 1] ; (35)
which implies that the preference for robustness, , is a strictly decreasing function of the prefer-
ence for the SOC, b, i.e.,
@
@b
=  
(
2a
(a+ b)2 2D [2  a (1  )]
+ (   1)
)
< 0:
Figure 1 shows that the tradeo¤ of between the SOC and robustness for di¤erent value of a.
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5 Concluding Remarks
By introducing both model uncertainty and the spirit of capitalism in the standard Merton model,
the paper derives the closed-form solutions for the optimal consumption and portfolio rules of a
robust investor with the desire for the SOC. Even though the two channels operate di¤erently,
the preference for both the SOC and robustness raises the investors e¤ective risk aversion,  +
[1 + (a+ b) (   1)]. The preference for the SOC acts in concert with the coe¢ cient of the relative
risk aversion, [1 + (a+ b) (   1)], while model uncertainty generates uncertainty aversion, .
Both channels make the investor more pessimistic in risk-taking and help to generate high risk
premium. Meanwhile, both an increase of the SOC and the desire for robustness lead to more
precautionary savings in equilibrium and the equilibrium interest rate will be lower. Therefore,
combining the preference for the SOC and robustness helps to resolve both the equity premium
and the risk-free rate puzzle.
6 Appendix (Not for Publication)
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Assmue that the value function takes the following form
V (w; t) =
A (t)
(a+ b) (1  )w
(a+b)(1 ); (36)
where A (t) is an undetermined function. Then, we know that Vw = A (t)w(a+b)(1 ) 1, Vww =
A (t) [(a+ b) (1  )  1]w(a+b)(1 ) 2, Vt = A
0(t)
(a+b)(1 )w
(a+b)(1 ). Substituting this guess into
the HJB equation (15) and taking the associated FOCs lead to the optimal conditions for con-
sumption and portfolio choice:
ct =
"
1
a

1
a+ b
  
1 
Vww
 b(1 )
# 1
a(1 ) 1
; (37)
t =
1
 + [1  (a+ b) (1  )]
  r
2
: (38)
Substituting (37) and (38) into the HJB equation (15) and arranging it, we can obtain a Bernoulli
equation about A (t), namely,
A0 (t) +
(1  ) (a (1  )  1)
1   A (t) =
(1  ) (a (1  )  1)
1    A (t)
1+ 1  
1 
1
a(1 ) 1 ;
12
where  and  are given by Proposition 2. The change of variable x (t) = A (t) 
1  
1 
1
a(1 ) 1 leads
to a rst order linear di¤erential equation of x (t) :
x0 (t)  x (t) =   ;
whose general solution is x (t) =   + e
t, where  is an arbitrary constant. By utilizing the
boundary condtion (5), we can nd  =    e t , and hence the undetermined function in the
value function
b (t) =

 


1  e (T t)
  (1 )(a(1 ) 1)1 
:
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium can be constructed as follows. The optimality condition are given by (30) and
(31). Substituting these two equations into the stochastic di¤erential equation for wealth (27)
gives us the equilibrium dynamics of wealth accumulation
dwt
wt
=
"
r
1  a (1  )  
a
a+ b

1  a (1  ) +
2  a (1  )
2 [1  a (1  )]
1
 

S   r
S
2#
dt+
1
 
S   r
S
dBt:
(39)
Combining the clearing condition of the security market with (31) immediately leads to a CCAPM
result: S   r =  2S . Substituting the result into (39) leads to
dwt
wt
=

r
[1  a (1  )]  
a
(a+ b)

[1  a (1  )] +
2  a (1  )
2 [1  a (1  )] 
2
S

dt+ SdBt: (40)
Equilibrium in the good market implies that ct = Dt = wt. Moreover St = 1Dt, so that in
equilibrium St = Wt. In addition, St = 1aDt implies that
dSt
St
= Ddt+ DdBt. Combining these
results with (40) yields the following equilibrium condition
w0 exp
8<:
0@ r[1 a(1 )]   a(a+b) [1 a(1 )]+
2 a(1 )
2[1 a(1 )] 
2
S   122S
1A t+ S Z t
=0
dB
9=; = S0 exp

D   1
2
2D

t+ D
Z t
=0
dB

:
This results in
S0 = w0;
13
D   1
2
2D =

r
[1  a (1  )]  
a
(a+ b)

[1  a (1  )] +
2  a (1  )
2 [1  a (1  )] 
2
S  
1
2
2S

; (41)
D = S : (42)
Rearranging the last two equations immediately produces equilibrium risk-free rate, i.e, (33).
Combining (26), (23) and the CCAPM result leads to the formula of equilibrium equity pre-
mium, i.e., (32) and the pessimistic scenario for the expected equilibrium premium supporting
the equilibrium, i.e., (34).
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